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are not without significance; and the present study of them is very illuminating.

But one is inclined to question whether the experience upon which Hegel is insisting in his category of life may rightly be called mystical. It is, indeed, an experience that cannot be exhausted by the mechanical categories of the *Critique of Pure Reason* or by the abstract universal, the moral law, of the *Critique of Practical Reason*. It is an experience that is more immediate than are the categories of discursive thought. But, when we have said so much, we have not necessarily identified the experience with the immediacy of mysticism. For the immediacy of mysticism we usually think of as an immediacy that transcends all mediation; and it is not clear that Hegel has in mind such an immediacy. If the identification is to be made, therefore, it would seem that a more detailed justification of it is necessary. This demand becomes all the more emphatic, when we recall the nature of the immediacy that is worked out in the *Phenomenology* and the *Encyclopædia*. For here we find that immediacy is the result of an elaborate process of mediation and that an unmediated immediacy is fundamentally erroneous. And, in the light of this fact, we are led to suspect that the immediacy of *Leben*, even at this early period in Hegel's development, means for him something more than mystical intuition.

Again, the writer of the essay is sometimes inclined to speak as if the younger Hegel were more faithful to experience than was the Hegel of maturer years. "Needless to say, the later Hegel became enmeshed in a metaphysical web of his own, and did not remain true to these more modest yet more significant intuitions of his youth" (p. 75). This way, however, danger lies. The notion that Hegel deserted experience in the *Encyclopædia* seems to me completely erroneous. It is interesting to have disclosed to us the fact that the hold of the younger Hegel on experience led to his break with the Kantian and Enlightenment philosophy; but we should never forget that the Hegel of later years was just as faithful to experience. If the Dialectic had its birth in the historical and concrete, it seems certain that it never lost its birth right.

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A Beginner's History of Philosophy. By HERBERT ERNEST CUSHMAN. Vol. II. Modern Philosophy. Boston, Houghton Mifflin Co., 1911.—pp. xvii, 377.

Not a great deal more needs to be added to the account of Professor Cushman's first volume which appeared in a recent number of the REVIEW. The same pedagogical treatment which constitutes the chief claim to attention on the part of the former volume is attempted also in dealing with the modern period; and while in the nature of the case the proportion of space given to the general progress of civilization has here to be decreased considerably in the interest of the presentation of systems, there still remains a sufficient difference of emphasis to justify the book as an addition to the texts now in the field. Both the Renaissance and the Enlightenment, which chiefly give

occasion for the special merits of the plan, receive a pretty satisfactory treatment, though the tendency is more generally apparent than in Vol. I to be a little too encyclopedic. In view of the difficulty of the task, Professor Cushman seems to me most successful in the endeavor to convey a sense of the continued and all-important interpenetration of the scientific motive in modern thought. The latter part of the book, beginning with the chapter on the German Idealists, I should consider the least adequate for the purposes of the inexpert reader. It may perhaps be said that since a text-book account of the Germans is bound in any case to be tolerably blind, it is better to devote to them a few pages of general appreciation than to try to be more detailed while still running the almost certain risk of falling short of clarity. But such a plan to be successful at least demands an excessive simplicity, and a careful avoidance of those highly generalized and subtle motives which come most easily from the pen of the philosopher when he is attempting a short-hand statement, and from which the amateur is likely to get few distinct ideas; and Professor Cushman does not succeed altogether in escaping this danger. The exposition of Kant, it may be said however, is much less open to such a criticism, and as a means of introducing the student to him seems to me to compare very favorably with similar attempts. The period succeeding German Idealism is still more sketchy, and there might easily be a difference of judgment about the relative proportions of space assigned, and the choice of names included. One might question, for example, whether Herbart deserves nearly nine pages to less than one for Comte, and a line or so for Spencer. But it is to be said that a book which is professedly a text book and nothing more, is probably wise in declining to deal otherwise than cursorily with the complications of recent philosophy, and so the choice of material has to be more or less arbitrary.

Of points of interpretation which I have noted, I will call attention to only two or three. The account of Descartes' method as an attempt to derive all other ideas from the original certainty of self, seems to me at least questionable of the major part of his treatment. In Kant, again, the distinction drawn (p. 243) between the conscious individual and the consciousness of humanity is not altogether easy to connect, as is here attempted, with Kant's traditional distinctions; and the statement of Fechner's parallelism (p. 359) suggests a confusion with a different type of theory. Professor Cushman's volumes however are to be approached primarily as essays in the pedagogy of philosophy. Such efforts, intelligently made on principle, are to be welcomed, and I can only repeat my conviction, expressed with reference to Vol. I, that the present attempt has many merits.

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English Philosophy: A Study of its Method and General Development. By THOMAS M. FORSYTH. London, Adam and Charles Black, 1910.—pp. xii, 231.

The purpose of this work, as the author states in his Preface, is not to give a history of English philosophy but rather an outline of the development of